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1986 TORT REFORM LEGISLATION: A SYSTEMATIC
EVALUATION OF CAPS ON DAMAGES AND
LIMITATIONS ON JOINT AND
SEVERAL LIABILITY
In 1986 more than three-fifths of the states enacted some form
of tort reform legislation.' These reforms range from a single refer-
endum 2 to more comprehensive changes. 3 Although the "insurance
crisis" was the most widely publicized factor that led states to adopt
tort reform measures, the state legislatures also were responding to
scholarship indicating that the tort system failed to achieve its objec-
tives4 and therefore should be substantially modified or even
eliminated.
5
The reforms that the states adopted made several substantial
changes in common-law tort doctrines, the most important of which
modify joint and several liability and limit noneconomic damages.
Although these two changes may serve equally well as means of
resolving the insurance crisis, they do not serve equally well as
means of reforming the tort system. The reforms that modify joint
1 Of the states that did not pass tort reform legislation in 1986, Arkansas, Ken-
tucky, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, and Texas did not have 1986 legislative
sessions. Legislatures in other states considered but did not enact legislation, and some
authorized committees to study the issue. See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures,
Selected State Action, in RESOLVING THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS: STATE LEGISLATIVE
ACTIVITIES IN 1986, COLLECTED PAPERS (1986) [hereinafter RESOLVING THE CRISIS].
2 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1-1431.5 (West Supp. 1988) (referendum "Prop-
osition 5 1"; abrogates joint and several liability for noneconomic damages only).
3 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-225a-d, 52-226a, 52-251a, 52-251e, 52-
557m-n, 52-568, 52-572h (West Supp. 1988) (modifies joint and several liability doc-
trine, sovereign immunity, and collateral source rule; provides for periodic payments,
costs for frivolous suits, and limits on attorney fees; places substantive limits on
liability).
4 See, e.g., G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135-97 (1970); O'Connell, A
"Neo No-Fault" Contract in Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guarantees of Postaccident Settlement Offers,
73 CALIF. L. REV. 898, 898 (1985) ("The present method of compensating accident vic-
tims is both wasteful and ineffectual."); Pierce, Institutional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 CA-
LIF. L. REV. 917, 917 (1985) ("It is no secret that tort law performs all of its primary
functions poorly."); Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 558, 664
(1985) ("Tort law is failing-failing to promote better conduct, failing to compensate
sensibly at acceptable costs, and failing to do meaningful justice to either plaintiffs or
defendants.").
5 See, e.g., O'Connell, Alternatives to the Tort System for Personal Injuries, 23 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 17 (1986) (suggesting statutes or contracts that require or encourage plaintiffs to
accept settlement offers for all economic losses); Pierce, supra note 4, at 932 (arguing
that an administrative agency could better develop a tort compensation system);
Sugarman, supra note 4, at 558 (proposing that legislatures replace tort remedies for




and several liability are consistent with the tort system's underlying
objectives. The reforms that cap noneconomic damages, however,
disregard those objectives and thus weaken the tort system's under-
lying rationale.
Part I of this Note describes the reforms and discusses their
evolution. Part II discusses the tort system's objectives, and Part III
analyzes the reforms' effectiveness in furthering those objectives.
This Note concludes that the reforms that limit joint and several
liability are appropriate while those that cap damages are not.
I
THE REFORMS
A. Problems Precipitating Reform
During the early 1980s the insurance industry reacted to a pe-
riod of growing losses by raising premiums and by cancelling and
refusing to renew or issue certain high-risk policies.6 These actions
by the insurance industry forced many businesses and municipalities
either to reduce services7 or to go uninsured. 8 Some businesses re-
sponded to increased insurance costs by raising their prices. 9 This
inability of businesses and municipalities to obtain reasonably
priced insurance is commonly known as the insurance crisis.
Many commentators and even some insurance industry officials
believe that the insurance industry is at least partly to blame for the
crisis. 10 In the 1970s, when interest rates were high, insurers over-
extended themselves by relying on investments rather than ade-
quate premiums to subsidize claim losses and produce profit."1 In
1984, when interest rates began to fall, insurers could no longer rely
on investment income to remain profitable and were forced to raise
6 See U.S. ATr'Y GEN. TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, ExTENT AND POLICY IMPLICA-
TIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY 6-15 (Feb.
1986) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT]; Trollin, Controlling Insurance Costs: State
Actions and Future Initiatives in the Area of Civil Justice Reform 1, in RESOLVING THE CRISIS,
supra note 1; see also LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, RESEARCH DIV., REPORT TO NEVADA'S
LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION, THE LIABILITY INSURANCE ISSUE 23 (1986) [hereinafter RE-
PORT TO NEVADA'S LEGIS. COMM.]; Labrec, The Municipal Liability Insurance Crisis, MUN.
ATr'Y, May-June 1986, at 15, 16.
7 See REPORT TO NEVADA'S LEGIS. COMM., supra note 6, at 2; WORKING GROUP RE-
PORT, supra note 6, at 9-13.
8 See supra note 7.
9 See REPORT TO NEVADA'S LEGIS. COMM., supra note 6, at 2; Trollin, supra note 6, at
1 ("The price of products is increased to cover the cost of insurance.").
10 REPORT TO NEVADA'S LEGIS. COMM., supra note 6, at 2; see, e.g., WORKING GROUP
REPORT, supra note 6, at 25; Trollin, supra note 6, at 1 ("part of the current problem can
be attributed to poor management practices of the insurance companies").
11 See Labrec, supra note 6, at 16; Trollin, supra note 6, at 1.
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premiums and to refuse to underwrite high risk policies.' 2
Some critics blame the insurance crisis solely on the insurance
industry and believe that tort law reform is unnecessary.' 3 How-
ever, the tort system itself must at least be suspect. In the past two
decades changes in the tort system have both expanded liability and
made that liability less predictable. Elimination of many sovereign
and charitable immunities,' 4 replacement of contributory negli-
gence with comparative negligence,' 5 and judicial acceptance of
strict liability rules1 6 have all created liability where previously there
was none.' 7 Courts have justified this expanded liability by relying
on the cost-spreading effect of insurance.' 8 By relying on this cost-
12 See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 6, at 25; Labrec, supra note 6, at 16;
Trollin, supra note 6, at 1.
13 See, e.g., F. BELLOTrI, J. VAN DE KAMP, L. THORNBURG, J. MArTox, C. BROWN & B.
LAFOLLETrE, AN ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE CURRENT CRISIS OF UNAVAILABILITY
AND UNAFFORDABILITY OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 41 (1986) ("The insurance industry,
rather than any sudden change in liability suits or recoveries, clearly bears great respon-
sibility for the recent premium hikes and cancellations."); Hunter & Borzilleri, The Liabil-
ity Insurance Crisis, TRIAL, Apr. 1986, at 42, 43 ("We believe the liability insurance crisis is
primarily an insurance problem."); Stewart, The "Tort Reform" Hoax, TRIAL, July 1986,
89, 93 ("the plea for tort reform is in reality a ploy designed to line the pockets of the
insurance industry"); Note, An Analysis of the Proposed Abrogation of California 's Joint and
Several Liability Doctrine: Is Abrogation the Answer to the Insurance Industry Crisis?, 8 WHITrIER
L. REV. 263, 298 (1986) (authored by Jay M. Tenenbaum) ('"crisis' and accompanying
'hysteria' is being created by the insurance industry"); see also REPORT TO NEVADA'S
LEGIS. COMM., supra note 6, at 5 ("Consumer organizations, trial lawyers and others
believe that no real linkage exists between the liability insurance problem and tort re-
form, and that the liability insurance 'crisis' is being used as justification to place limits
on the rights of injured people to sue for and recover damages.").
14 "The rule that charitable organizations are not liable in tort stems from an Eng-
lish case, Foefees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 C. & F. 508, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508 (1846),
in which the court reasoned that the payment of such claims would violate the purposes
for which the funds were given to the hospital by the donor." J. HENDERSON & R. PEAR-
SON, THE TORTS PROCESS 621-22 (1981).
15 For a discussion of contributory and comparative negligence, see infra note 46.
16 Under the rule of strict liability the plaintiff need not prove that the defendant is
negligent. Rather, he must prove only that the defendant caused his injury. For a dis-
cussion of strict liability, see generally J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, supra note 14, at
626-49.
17 R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 4-10 (1969) (noting many examples of
judicial reform of tort system in 1960s, including abrogation of governmental, charitable
and familial immunities, elimination of obstacles to recovery for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, establishment of comparative negligence, and movement toward
strict liability for defective products); REPORT TO NEVADA'S LEGIS. COMM., supra note 6,
at 5; Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15 GA. L. REV. 963,
964 (1981) ("Among the leading events within tort law during the past quarter-century
has been the abrogation of a variety of immunities that intruded into tort law .... );
Simon, Torts I, 1983 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 641 (In the 1970s, "Courts recognized new
claims, expanded the scope of existing causes of actions, and announced pro-plaintiff
verdicts with increasing regularity.").
18 See, e.g., Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1974);
Helling v. Carey, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951); see also Epstein, Products Liability as
an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 645, 646 (1985) ("One of the central historical
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spreading factor, courts have undermined the validity of the as-
sumptions upon which insurance companies predict losses and set
premiums. 19
Another factor underlying the 1986 reforms is a basic distrust
of the jury system.20 In the typical tort case the jury determines
both liability and damages. Commentators have expressed two ma-
jor criticisms of this system. They argue that juries are biased
against deep-pocket defendants2 1 and that inconsistent jury awards
often lead to situations where plaintiffs with similar injuries are
awarded substantially different damages. 22
These two criticisms of the jury system are not necessarily in-
dependent. Indeed, the bias against deep-pocket defendants may
lead to inconsistent damage awards. One independent reason for
the variance in awards is the difficulty that juries have in quantifying
noneconomic damages such as pain and suffering. Because the mar-
ket system does not adequately price noneconomic damages, 23
American society has chosen to rely on the jury system to place a
value on them.24 However, because no objective criteria exist for
valuing these damages, they may vary widely and become astro-
justifications for the expansion of products liability has appealed to the availability of
insurance in voluntary markets .. "); Schmit & Phelps, Two-Way Causality Between Insur-
ance and Liability, 69 MARO. L. REV. 33, 34-35 (1985) (case documentation of relation
between extension of liability and availability of insurance); Weinrib, The Insurance Justifi-
cation and Private Law, 14J. LEGAL STUD. 681, 681 (1985) ("Whether the insurance justifi-
cation is regarded as essential or supernumerary, it is part of a conception of law that is
now dominant in the United States ....").
19 Insurance companies base their loss predictions on three assumptions: that the
information on which the prediction is based represents all loss information for the pre-
diction period; that exposures to loss are independent and homogeneous; and that out-
comes are random. Courts threaten the validity of these assumptions when they justify
placing liability on a defendant because the defendant has insurance. When courts
change the basis upon which they assess liability, past losses no longer represent future
losses. For exposures to be independent, a change in the probability of one exposure
must not affect the probability of another. When immunities are abrogated, exposures
are no longer independent because when one formerly immune party is held liable the
probability of another being held liable increases dramatically. Finally, if courts impose
liability because defendants are insured, exposure to risk is no longer random. Policy-
holders can affect the amount of their potential liability by altering their level of insur-
ance. Schmit & Phelps, supra note 18, at 46-47.
20 The federal and most state constitutions guarantee the right to a jury trial. See,
e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII; CAL. CONST. art I, § 16; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2, art. VI,
§ 18; PA. CONsT. art. I, § 6.
21 See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
22 See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
23 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAw § 6.12, at 182 (3d ed. 1986)
(discussing difficulty in valuing injuries); O'Connell, supra note 4, at 899, 892 (noting
lack of market for losses such as pain, indignity, and loss of happiness).
24 Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 772, 778
(1985) ("Courts have recognized that there is no exchange value for pain and suffering
or emotional distress and, therefore, have relied upon the collective judgment of the
juries to quantify such injuries.").
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nomically high. 25
Tort law is primarily common law. State legislatures have
rarely initiated major changes in tort law. 26 The medical malprac-
tice crisis of the 1970s, where the rising cost and scarcity of medical
malpractice liability insurance increasingly threatened the health
care systems, 27 prompted the most recent legislative intervention in
tort law before 1986. In response to this crisis, almost every state
enacted tort reform legislation designed to limit health care provid-
ers' potential malpractice liability. 28 These reforms included using
alternative dispute resolution techniques such as screening or arbi-
tration panels, providing for periodic rather than lump-sum award
payments, restricting attorney contingency fees, eliminating the col-
lateral source rule,29 and capping damages.30
Medical malpractice victims attacked the constitutionality of
these reforms, claiming that they violated both state and federal due
process and equal protection guarantees. State courts split on the
constitutionality of the statutes.3' Commentators continue to ques-
25 Id. at 803-05 ("Yet, without any market yardstick against which to measure their
judgments, juries . . . have unfettered discretion to determine the extent of dam-
ages.") (footnote omitted).
26 W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 3, at 19 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter W. KEETON] ("Tort law is overwhelm-
ingly common law .... "); REPORT TO NEVADA'S LEGIS. COMM., supra note 6, at 6 ("Tort
law traditionally has developed through judicial declarations and reinterpretations of
legal principles in individual lawsuits."); Green, The Thrust of Tort Law: The Influence of
Environment (pt. 1), 64 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 1 (1961) ("expansion of tort law is the product
of the courts with minor assistance of legislatures").
Negligence and strict product liability rules, the bulwark of tort law, all originated as
common law. See F. HARPER, F. JAMES & 0. GRAY, 3 LAW OF TORTS § 12.3, at 110-14,
§§ 14.3-14.4, at 190-214 (1986) [hereinafter F. HARPER]. Although some states adopted
comparative negligence by statute, see W. KEETON, supra, § 67, at 471-74, nn.31, 39-40 &
48, in many states the courts made this change. Id. at 471-72 nn. 28 & 31; see, e.g., Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (adoption of
pure comparative negligence); Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981) (pro-
spective adoption of pure comparative negligence).
27 See Note, Ohio's Attempts to Halt the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Effective or Meaning-
less?, 9 U. DAYTON L. REV. 361 (1984) (authored by Thomas J. O'Connell & Amy
Tolnitch).
28 See REPORT TO NEVADA'S LEGIS. COMM., supra note 6, at 6; Bell, Legislative Intru-
sions into the Common Law of Medical Malpractice: Thoughts About the Deterrent Effect of Tort
Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 939, 943 (1984) ("In 1975 and 1976 alone, forty-three
states and two territories legislatively modified one or more significant aspects of [medi-
cal malpractice] common law.").
29 Under the collateral source rule, the damages the plaintiff receives are not re-
duced by amounts the plaintiff receives in compensation for his loss from other sources
such as medical insurance or disability benefits. 4 F. HARPER, supra note 26, § 25.22, at
648-50.
30 Karzon, Medical Malpractice Statutes: A Retrospective Analysis, 1984 ANN. SURV. OF
AM. L. 693.
31 Compare Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 164, 695 P.2d 665,
682, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 386 (1985) ($25,000 cap on noneconomic damages in medical
632 [Vol. 73:628
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tion the effectiveness of these reforms.32
B. The 1986 Legislation
The 1986 tort reforms differ from the 1970 medical malpractice
reforms in two respects. First, where the 1970 reforms applied only
to medical malpractice claims, the 1986 reforms apply to all types of
tort actions. Second, unlike the 1970 reforms, the 1986 reforms
substantially modify or even eliminate the traditional joint and sev-
eral liability doctrine.
In 1986 two reforms widely adopted by the states were modifi-
cations ofjoint and several liability and caps on noneconomic dam-
ages. Other reforms included eliminating the collateral source
rule,33 reestablishing many sovereign immunities,3 4 limiting liability
malpractice actions and modification of collateral source rule do not violate state or
federal constitution), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 892 (1985) andJohnson v. St. Vincent Hospi-
tal, Inc., 273 Ind. 374, 390, 404 N.E.2d 585, 598 (1980) ($500,000 cap on total damages,
required submission to -nedical review panel, limitation on attorney's fees, reduced stat-
utes of limitations, and prohibition against addendum clauses in medical malpractice
actions do not violate plaintiff's jury trial, equal protection, or due process rights under
state or federal constitution) with Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 942-43, 424 A.2d
825, 837 (1980) (restrictions on expert testimony, reduction in statute of limitations, 60-
day notice requirement, elimination of collateral source rule, limitation on attorney fees,
and $250,000 cap on noneconomic damages applicable only to medical malpractice ac-
tions violates equal protection guarantees of state and federal constitutions) and Arne-
son v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978) ($300,000 cap on total recovery in
medical malpractice actions violates equal protection guarantee of state and federal con-
stitutions; combination of other provisions in statute, including near elimination of col-
lateral source rule, violates due process).
32 See, e.g., Karzon, supra note 30, at 696; Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis in
the 1970's: A Retrospective, 49 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 5, 30 ("Examina-
tion of individual reforms ... indicates that most of the flurry was just that-more show
than substance."); Note, supra note 27, at 362 ("the effectiveness of these measures in
actual practice remains a controversial question").
33 About ten states have modified or abrogated the collateral source rule. Most of
these statutes provide that if the plaintiff's award is reduced because of his receipt of
collateral source benefits then the plaintiff is entitled to recover the cost of securing
those benefits. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 09.17.070 (Supp. 1987) (plaintiff's recovery re-
duced only by collateral payments with no right to subrogation less costs including at-
torney's fees); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (1987) (plaintiff entitled to recover all
payments made pursuant to contract for benefits "by or on [his) behalf"); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 548.36 (West Supp. 1988) (plaintiff entitled to recover all payments made to
secure benefits by plaintiff, family, or employer within two year period beginning prior
to action); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 4545(c) (McKinney Supp. 1988) (plaintiff entitled to
recover cost of securing collateral payments within period beginning two years prior to
action and subsequent payments necessary to maintain benefits).
34 Various states have passed statutes giving the state immunity from liability re-
sulting from the state's use of its licensing and inspection powers, see, e.g., CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-557n(b)(7) (West Supp. 1988); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(9) (1986),
its operation of prisons and hospitals, see, e.g., W.VA. CODE § 29-12A-5(a)(14) (1986),
civil disobedience, riots, or the failure to provide police or fire protection, see, e.g., OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 155 (West Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(a)(6) (Law. Co-
op. Supp. 1986), acts of third persons, see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(a)(20) (Law.
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for certain activities or actors, 35 providing for periodic rather than
lump-sum award payments, 36 and limiting punitive damages.3 7 Re-
forms intended to improve the administration of the tort system in-
clude limiting attorney's fees,38 imposing penalties on plaintiffs who
bring frivolous suits,3 9 and encouraging nontrial dispute resolu-
tions.40 Unlike many of the other reforms, modifications to joint
Co-op. Supp. 1987), and employee conduct outside the scope of official duty, see, e.g.,
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557n (West Supp. 1988); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-60(a)(17)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987).
35 Various statutes have limited liability for unpaid officers of nonprofit corpora-
tions, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.50 (Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8133
(Supp. 1986); N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAw § 720-a (McKinney Supp. 1988), per-
sons rendering assistance in emergency, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09-65-091 (Supp.
1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-116 (1987), landowners, see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-21-115 (1987); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2795 (West Supp. 1988), failure to warn of
another's violence, see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-117 (1987); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 148.975 (West Supp. 1988), volunteer sports staff and nonprofit sport organizations,
see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 6836 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-6 (West
1987), injuries to those attempting to commit a felony, see WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.24.420 (West Supp. 1987), products liability claims against nonmanufacturers, see,
e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 613.18 (West Supp. 1987), and those manufacturing or selling
guns, see 1986 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-501-505 (1987).
36 See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 657-24 (Supp. 1987) (political subdivisions given op-
tion of paying judgment over five year period when judgment is greater than $1 million);
MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-109 (Supp. 1987) (court can order periodic
payments for future economic damages "as consistent with the needs of the plaintiff");
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.6307 (West 1987) (order for periodic payments auto-
matic when judgment exceeds $250,000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.260 (West
Supp. 1987) (order for periodic payments at request of a party when future economic
damages of at least $100,000).
37 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Supp. 1987) (must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (1987) (punitive damages must be
reasonable and no greater than actual damages); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.191 (West
Supp. 1988) (plaintiff may claim punitive damages only after hearing in which he estab-
lishes prima facie case for such).
38 Many of the new statutes simply require that the attorney's fees be reasonable.
See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 607-15.5 (Supp. 1987) (must be reasonable as approved by
court). But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-2516 (West Supp. 1988) (establishing table
for attorney contingency fees); MD. STATE GOV'T CODE ANN. § 12-109 (1987) (fees may
not exceed 20% of settlement or 25% ofjudgment).
39 These statutes variously define a "frivolous suit" as one that has no justifiable
issue; is unsubstantiated by fact or law; is brought to harass, delay or embarrass; or one
that is not made in good faith. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 57.105 (West Supp. 1988)
(absence of justifiable issues; costs to be assessed in equal amounts against party and
attorney unless attorney acted in good faith based on representations of client); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 607-14.5 (Supp. 1987) (totally unsubstantiated by facts and law; reasonable
attorney's fees, limited to 25% of claimed damages); IOWA CODE ANN. § 617.16 (West
Supp. 1987) (if plaintiff has brought three prior unsuccessful suits which court decides
were frivolous, court may require plaintiff to post bond before suit is allowed to
continue).
40 See e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.4951-4969 (West 1987) (requires non-
binding mediation in civil actions in which greater than $10,000 damages claimed; if
party rejects mediated settlement, party must pay opposing party's costs unless verdict is
at least 10% more favorable to rejecting party than mediation evaluation).
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and several liability and caps on noneconomic damages do not
merely affect issues at tort law's periphery; rather, they substantially
change its foundation.
1. Joint and Several Liability
Under joint and several liability, a tort victim who is injured by
two or more tortfeasors may recover his total damages from any one
of the tortfeasors, regardless of the portion of fault attributable to
that tortfeasor.41 The tortfeasors are jointly liable because the
plaintiff could sue them all and get a judgment against them jointly;
they are severally liable because the plaintiff could sue any one of
them individually for the total damages. 42 Whether a defendant is
subject to joint and several liability makes little difference in most
cases; the one-recovery rule,43 contribution,44 and joinder of par-
ties45 usually assure that defendants pay only their share of dam-
ages. When one defendant is insolvent or immune from suit,
however, joint and several liability affects the amount that a defend-
ant must pay.
When states replaced contributory negligence with comparative
negligence,46 only a minority of states also eliminated joint and sev-
41 See Riley v. Industrial Fin. Serv. Co., 157 Tex. 306, 310, 302 S.W.2d 652, 655
(1957) ("[W]here two or more wrongdoers join to produce an indivisible injury, all of
the wrongdoers are jointly and severally liable to the person wronged for the entire
damage suffered. The wronged person as plaintiff may sue one or more of the
tortfeasors."); Arminius Chemical Co. v. Landrum, 113 Va. 7, 22, 73 S.E. 459, 466
(1913) (where the negligence of two or more persons, acting independently, concur-
rently results in an injury to a third, latter may maintain his action for entire loss against
any one or all of the negligent parties); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 875-
879 (1982).
42 J. HENDERSON & A. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILrrY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 43
(1986).
43 See Miller v. F. Beck & Co., 108 Iowa 575, 577-78, 79 N.W. 344, 344 (1899) ("a
person injured by an act of joint wrongdoers is entitled to but one satisfaction for the
injury sustained"); Riley, 157 Tex. at 310, 302 S.W.2d at 655 ("[A] plaintiff having been
injured by the same set of circumstances sustains but one injury and may receive but one
satisfaction for such injury, although more than one person may contribute to such
injury.").
44 Although the common law rule prohibited contribution among tortfeasors, today
most states allow contributions. If a defendant is held liable for more than his share of
damages, he can sue his fellow tortfeasors to recover the excess. W. KEETON, supra note
26, § 50, at 336-41. For a list of statutes and court decisions recognizing the right of
contribution, see 3 F. HARPER, supra note 26, § 10.2, at 41-42, nn.6-8. See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886.
45 The procedural codes of most states further trial convenience by allowing liberal
joinder of parties. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 1002(b) (McKinney 1976) ("Persons
against whom there is asserted any right to reliefjointly, severally, or in the alternative,
arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences,
may be joined in one action as defendants if any common question of law or fact would
arise.").
46 Under a contributory negligence regime, if a plaintiff's negligence contributed
1988] 635
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eral liability.47 Many people in government, business, and the insur-
ance industry believe that a tort regime that includes both joint and
several liability and comparative negligence is grossly unfair to de-
fendants. 48 A simple example demonstrates the unfairness. As-
sume that a one-car accident causes injuries to a passenger. The
passenger names as defendants in a tort action both the automobile
driver and the municipality responsible for maintaining the road
where the accident took place. Assume that the jury finds the driver
ninety-nine percent responsible for the passenger's injuries and the
municipality only one-percent responsible. If the driver is insolvent,
the city will have to pay the entire judgment.
49
In the 1986 tort reforms, many comparative negligence states
that had retained joint and several liability either limited or elimi-
nated joint and several liability in an attempt to alleviate the unfair-
ness that may result from the combined application of the two rules.
Most of the modifications to joint and several liability apply both to
economic and noneconomic damages. 50 Some states have elimi-
to his injury, the plaintiff is barred from any recovery. Under pure comparative negli-
gence, the plaintiff's negligence never bars his recovery. Rather, the court must reduce
his damage award to reflect his negligence. Under the two types of modified compara-
tive negligence, the plaintiff's negligence bars his recovery if he is at least 50% responsi-
ble for his injury. W. KEETON, supra note 26, § 65, at 451-53, § 67, at 471-74. As of the
end of 1986 all but four states-Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina and Tennessee-
had adopted comparative negligence. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 25
(1986).
47 For a list of approximately one-half dozen states which have eliminated joint and
several liability, see W. KEETON, supra note 26, § 67, at 475 n.59. For a typical statute
that eliminates joint and several liability, see OHIO REV. CODE § 2315.19 (Anderson
1981) ("each person against whom recovery is allowed is liable.., for a portion of total
damages allowed"). For a typical court decision eliminating the doctrine, see Brown v.
Keil, 224 Kan. 195, 580 P.2d 867 (1978).
48 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 1431 (West Supp. 1988) ("Some governmental and
private defendants are perceived to have substantial financial resources or insurance
coverage and have thus been included in lawsuits even though there was little or no
basis for finding them at fault."); Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, A.B.A.
J., July 1985, at 61, 61 ("Public entities, often dragged into cases as defendants with
scant liability exposure, find themselves the target defendants forced to pay off the en-
tire judgment when codefendants can't pay."); Young, Tort Judgments Against Cities: The
Sky's the Limit, 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 1509 ("Modern juries seem to have the impression
that municipalities have access to a bottomless pot of gold from which to pay verdicts of
millions of dollars rendered in questionable, and even fraudulent, cases.").
49 See Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387, 390 (Hawaii 1986). This case is of interest other
than as an illustration. The Hawaii Supreme Court held in this case that the trial court
erred when it refused to give the jury an instruction on the legal effect of apportioning
negligence among tortfeasors. Id. at 396.
50 The exceptions are California and Hawaii. In California, joint and several liabil-
ity based on principles of comparative fault does not apply to noneconomic damages in
actions for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1431 (West Supp. 1988). In Hawaii, joint and several liability applies to noneconomic
damages only if the defendant is at least 25% responsible for the plaintiffs injury. Joint
and several liability continues to apply for all economic damages and for noneconomic
nated the rule entirely: no defendant may be liable for damages
greater than those attributable to his action unless the defendants
acted in concert. 51 Some states provide for different liability alloca-
tion rules depending on the percentage of fault attributable to each
tortfeasor,52 and at least one state reallocates an insolvent defend-
ant's portion of the damages among other defendants according to
their percentage of fault.
53
2. Caps on Noneconomic Damages
The statutory caps on noneconomic damages that legislatures
enacted as part of the 1986 tort reforms vary as much among states
as do the changes in the joint and several liability rule. The caps
simply limit plaintiffs' damages for noneconomic losses to the
amount of the cap. Under those statutes that address the proce-
dural issue, the jury determines the amount of the noneconomic
damages and the judge reduces the judgment by any amount in ex-
cess of the cap.
5 4
The statutory caps on noneconomic damages, most of which in-
clude or are directed at damages for pain and suffering,55 range
from $250,000 to $875,000 for a single claim. 56 Washington's legis-
damages as well in certain types of torts such as intentional torts, toxic and asbestos-
related torts, and strict and products liability actions. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 663-10.9
(Supp. 1987).
51 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-40
(1987).
52 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09-17-080 (Supp. 1987) (joint and several liability; de-
fendant less than 50% at fault liable for no more than twice his percentage of fault); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.81 (West Supp. 1988) (negligent defendant liable for no more than his
percentage of the damage unless his fault equals or exceeds that of claimant); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 538.230 (Vernon 1988) (in medical malpractice actions, joint liability only with
defendants whose fault is equal to or less then their own); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.22.070 (West Supp. 1987) (defendant's liability joint and several only if plaintiff not
negligent or defendants acted in concert); W. VA. CODE § 29-12A-7 (1986) (joint and
several liability eliminated only against political subdivisions and only when defendant
less than 25% at fault).
53 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572(h) (West Supp. 1987).
54 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5(4)(1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508.4-
d(II) (Supp. 1987).
55 But see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.23 (West Supp. 1988) (cap on "intangible" loss
including embarrassment, emotional distress, and loss of consortium but does not cap
pain and suffering).
56 ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (Supp. 1987) ($500,000 except in cases of disfigure-
ment or severe physical impairment); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102.5 (1987) ($250,000
unless clear and convincing evidence indicates greater damages warranted; in no case
more than $500,000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.80 (West Supp. 1988) ($450,000); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 663-867 (Supp. 1987) ($375,000 except for specified types of torts such as
strict and products liability, intentional torts, and environmental pollution torts); MD.
CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-108 (Supp. 1987) ($350,000); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.1483 (West Supp. 1987) ($225,000 in medical malpractice cases unless,
among other exceptions, tort causes death, injury involves reproductive system, limb or
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lation does not set an absolute cap, but rather provides a formula
based on the average annual wage and life expectancy of the plain-
tiff.57 Some states limit the caps to medical malpractice actions58 or
actions against political subdivisions, 59 while others cap all deriva-
tive noneconomic damages. 60 Finally, some states index the cap to
inflation 61 or provide for exceptions to the cap in cases involving
very severe injuries, such as disfigurement, 62 in an attempt to avoid
grossly inadequate awards to plaintiffs.
One can only speculate whether the tort reforms of 1986 will
successfully solve the current insurance crisis or prevent future cri-
ses. The effect that these reforms will have on the nature of the tort
system is less speculative. The state legislatures did not evidence an
intent to change the fundumental nature of tort law; thus, the re-
forms should address the insurance crisis in a manner consistent
with the tort system's historical objectives. Limits on joint and sev-
eral liability are consistent with these objectives, but caps on
noneconomic damages are not.
II
OBJECTIVES OF THE TORT SYSTEM
Tort scholars suggest that three of the tort system's primary
objectives are promoting justice,63 deterring potentially injurious
organ wrongfully removed or vital bodily function lost); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.23
(West Supp. 1988) ($400,000 for intangible losses; does not include pain and suffering);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.210 (Vernon Supp. 1987) ($350,000 per defendant in medical
malpractice actions); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-108 (1987) ($750,000 for each claim, $1.5
million for each occurrence against political subdivision; statute terminates in 1991);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-d (Supp. 1987) ($875,000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987) (limits total damages to $250,000 per plaintiff and $500,000
per occurrence against political subdivision).
57 Noneconomic damages may not exceed (.43%) x (average annual wage) x (plain-
tiff's life expectancy). WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.56.250 (Supp. 1987).
58 See, e.g., MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483 (West Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-581.15 (Supp. 1987).
59 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-120 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE
§ 29-12A-7 (1986).
60 See, e.g., Mo. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-108 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 4.56.250 (Supp. 1987).
61 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483 (West Supp. 1987) (caps reflect the cumula-
tive annual percentage increase in the consumer price index); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.2 10
(1986) (indexed to U.S. implicit price deflation).
62 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.1483 (West Supp. 1987).
63 See, e.g., W. KEETON, supra note 26, § 3, at 15 ("[tort law's] primary purpose is to
make a fair adjustment of the conflicting claims of the litigating parties"); SPECIAL
COMM. ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, AM. BAR ASS'N, TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF
INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN
TORT LAw 4-154 (1984) [hereinafter ABA REPORT] ("a general notion of 'justice' per-
vades the tort liability system"); id. at 4-41 ("the jurisprudence of injury is rich with
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activities,6 4 and compensating accident victims.6 5 Although the jus-
tice and deterrence objectives often require the same outcomes, the
compensation objective may require an outcome inconsistent with
the other two goals. 66 This potential inconsistency, coupled with
the tort system's poor design for adequately compensating vic-
tims, 67 suggests that compensation is at most a subsidiary goal of
tort law, and perhaps is merely a means of fulfilling the justice and
deterrence objectives.
A. The Justice Objective
It is a sense of injustice that activates the tort process.68 When
someone is injured solely by an act of fate, neither the injured party
nor society seeks to shift the victim's loss through the tort system.
Tort actions arise only when the injured individual believes that an-
other has wronged him.
69
indications of the grip that 'fairness' has on decision makers as a goal of law"); Owen,
Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 665, 674 (1985) ("Any fair
critique of the traditional tort system's capacity to compensate and prevent accidental
losses must recognize that it is a system limited in both respects by its theoretical basis in
corrective justice."); Weinrib, supra note 18, at 686 ("corrective justice is ... thejustifi-
catory structure... through which private law makes good its claim to rationality."); cf
G. CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 24 (one principal of any system of accident law is that it
must be just or fair).
Some commentators speak of "fairness" rather than "justice," but the contexts in
which the two terms are used aid little in distinguishing them. This Note treats them as
interchangeable in most uses but adopts the term "justice" because it implies reliance
on a standard; it has more substance than does fairness. See WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 299 (1972).
64 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(c) (1979) (purpose of tort law is
"to punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct"); 3 F. HARPER, supra note 26,
§ 11.5, at 98-99 (noting deterrence objective of tort law); W. KEETON, supra note 26, § 4,
at 25 ("The courts are concerned not only with compensation of the victim, but with the
admonition of the wrongdoer.").
65 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (a) (purpose of tort law is "to punish
wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct"); R. KEETON, supra note 17, at 147 ("The pri-
mary objective of Anglo-American tort law is fair and just compensation for losses");
Green, supra note 26, at 3 ("It may well be that down to this day the strongest bastion of
tort law is found in the strong reaction of the human heart that one who hurts his
brother should make recompense ...."); see also Sugarman, supra note 4, at 591 ("Over
the past few decades, it has become increasingly popular to view victim compensation as
the central purpose of tort law."); Note, supra note 13, at 296 ("Joint and several liability
exists to satisfy the basic policy of the tort system-making the injured plaintiff whole.").
66 Cf Smith, The Critics and the "Crisis": A Restatement of Current Conceptions of Tort
Law, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 777-78 (1987) (proposed tort law functions each reflect a
different policy); Owen, supra note 63, at 674 ("tasks of establishing fair and efficient
systems for compensation and accident deterrence are fundamentally separate tasks").
67 See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
68 See Smith, supra note 66, at 783 (important element of victim's injury is "sense of
injustice," defined as the "sense of having been wronged").
69 ABA REPORT, supra note 63, at 12-4 ("[T]ort actions spring from one individual's
belief that another has done a 'wrong.' ").
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The tort system offers a peaceful means of settling disputes,
providing an alternative to the potentially disruptive use of self-
help. 70 In addition, by punishing those who violate society's norms,
tort law reaffirms the validity of those norms, thus allowing society's
members to rely on them with confidence. 71 To achieve both of
these ends, the tort system must resolve disputes justly. Tort law
seeks to effect corrective justice, 72 which "is the understanding of
interaction in terms of itself and not in terms of an extrinsically de-
vised purpose."' 73  Corrective justice is individualized; 74  the
factfinder determines both liability and remedy solely on the basis of
the dispute at hand.
75
Although the form of justice that tort law seeks to achieve is
justice between the parties to a suit, societal norms shape the sub-
stance of that justice. 76 American tort law relies heavily on the no-
tion that one must take responsibility for harm resulting from his
actions. 77 At most, this notion requires a plaintiff to show that his
injury was the defendant's "fault"; at a minimum, under strict liabil-
ity, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's action in some way
70 Smith, supra note 66, at 779; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (d)
(1979) (one purpose of tort is "to vindicate parties and deter retaliation or violent and
unlawful self-help"); ABA REPORT, supra note 63, at 3-18 ("[W]e suggest that tort law
serves both as a grievance mechanism ... and as a brake on the overt conflict that may
break through the crust of civilization when injury victims have reason to believe that
society is not responding justly to their plight.").
71 Smith, supra note 66, at 786-90.
72 W. KEETON, supra note 26, § 3, at 15; cf Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory,
85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972) (advocating "paradigm of reciprocity," which looks only to
degree of risk imposed by parties on each other over "paradigm of reasonableness"
which surrenders the individual to community needs).
73 Weinrib, supra note 18, at 686.
74 ABA REPORT, supra note 63, at 12-6 (tort law seeks "balance between values of
predictability and of individualized justice").
75 See W. KEETON, supra note 26, § 32, at 175 ("negligence is failure to do what the
reasonable person would do 'under the same or similar circumstances' "); infra note 86
and accompanying text.
76 3 F. HARPER, supra note 26, § 11.5, at 98 (Measures to reduce the cost of acci-
dents "must on the whole satisfy the ethical or moral sense of the community, its feeling
of what is fair and just."); Henderson, Extending the Boundaries of Strict Products Liability:
Implications of the Theory of the Second Best, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1036, 1041 (1980) (one of
overall objectives of tort liability system is "fairness, in the sense of furthering shared
notions of social morality"); Smith, supra note 66, at 786-94 (function of tort system is
resolution of disputes that arise when social norms are violated and injuries occur).
77 Fault traditionally has been the most widely accepted reason for shifting a loss
through the tort system. R. KEETON, supra note 17, at 148-52. Even today fault is an
important consideration in invoking use of the tort system. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 4.16.160 note on Preamble-Laws 1986, ch. 305 (West Supp. 1988) ("[I]t is the
intent of the legislature to reduce costs associated with the tort system, while assuring
that adequate and appropriate compensation for persons injured thru the fault of others is
available.") (emphasis added); Schwartz, supra note 17, at 977 ("[T]he very idea of liabil-
ity in tort seems tied to the assumption of liability founded on some fault-related
standard.").
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caused his injuryJ
8
B. The Deterrence Objective
The tort system seeks to deter potentially injurious activities by
forcing people to internalize the costs of their actions. 79 Economic
theory posits that an actor will continue to pursue an act until the
act's marginal costs outweigh its marginal benefits.80 Thus, by in-
creasing the marginal costs of unsafe behavior, the tort system will
decrease the level of such behavior.
The deterrence objective differs from the justice and compensa-
tion objectives in that it is not an absolute objective.8 ' Because re-
ducing the number and severity of accidents generates costs as well
as benefits, deterring all dangerous activities is not desirable. Any
attempt to prevent all injuries would curtail many beneficial activi-
ties. For example, although society could avoid automobile acci-
dents by banning the automobile, society will not accept such a high
cost. Instead, society reduces the number of potential accidents by
imposing costs on unsafe drivers commensurate with the harm they
cause. Thus, tort law seeks to strike a balance between society's de-
sire to prevent injuries and its need to allow some hazardous
activities.
The tort system relies on the marketplace to determine the "op-
timal" number of accidents that society should allow. 8 2 It attempts
to force actors to internalize all the costs of their activities,83 includ-
ing costs that fall on others. Forcing actors to internalize these costs
78 Even under strict liability the plaintiff must prove causation. W. KEETON, supra
note 26, § 41, at 263 (noting that causation is essential element in all tort actions); cf.
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 976 (arguing that the negligence conception persists even in
strict liability reasoning; doctrine of strict products liability is "little more than a reason-
able and moderate adaptation to the basic negligence standard").
79 G. CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 69 ("General deterrence implies that accident
costs would be treated as one of the many costs we face whenever we do anything."); see
also Owen, supra note 63, at 670 (market deterrence fair because "persons who benefit
from a good or service generally should pay for all the necessary costs of making the
good or providing the service").
80 See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
81 G. CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 17 ("Our society is not committed to preserving
life at any cost."); R. POSNER, supra note 23, § 6.12, at 182 ("[lIt is plain that people are
unwilling, individually or collectively, to incur the costs necessary to reduce the rate of
fatal accidents [to zero]."); Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand Experi-
ence, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 976, 976 (1985) ("commentators more recently have regarded the
deterrent role of negligence as seeking not the elimination of all injuries, but an optimal
balance between the number of injuries and the social benefits of the activities which
produce them").
82 G. CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 69 (tort system determines accident costs of activi-
ties and lets the market determine optimal level of each activity).
83 Id.; Pierce, Encouraging Safety: The Limits of Tort Law and Government Regulation, 33
VAND. L. REV. 1281, 1289-90 (1980).
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results in prices for goods or services that reflect all of the costs
associated with those goods or services. People will engage in in-
jury-producing activities only if the personal benefits of those activi-
ties outweigh societal costs.
C. The Compensation Objective
The compensation objective often is not only compatible with
justice and deterrence, but also is necessary to achieve those goals.
Once a court holds a defendant liable for a victim's loss, tort law
requires that the tortfeasor compensate the injured party fully. Tort
law attempts to compensate the injured party for all losses attributa-
ble to the tortfeasor's actions, so that the injured party is in the
same position as he would have been had the tortfeasor not acted.
8 4
Recoverable losses include medical expenses, lost earnings, other
economic losses, and, to the extent possible, pain and suffering and
other intangible losses.8 5 Only when the injured party is "made
whole" is justice achieved.8 6
Compensation furthers the deterrence objective in two ways.
First, forcing tortfeasors to compensate injured parties discourages
people from engaging in potentially dangerous activities.8 7 Addi-
tionally, holding injurers liable for injured parties' losses expresses
societal disapproval of an act, thus stigmatizing tortfeasors as
wrongdoers; the stigma created by an adverse judgment may deter
individuals from engaging in unsafe behavior, and the publicity con-
nected with an adverse judgment may warn consumers away from
dangerous products.
88
Although compensation may support the justice and deterrence
objectives, compensation makes little sense as a primary tort objec-
tive. First, the utterly inefficient manner in which the tort system
compensates victims makes it difficult to accept compensation as
tort law's primary goal. Administrative costs and attorney's fees ab-
sorb a large percentage of every dollar awarded through the tort
84 ABA REPORT, supra note 63, at 4-29.
85 See generally 4 F. HARPER, supra note 26, §§ 25.8-25.10. Tort law does not provide
compensation for all harm that results from a defendant's action. For example, compen-
sation is not usually granted for economic loss unassociated with physical damage to the
plaintiff's body or property, prejudgment interest, or attorney's fees. Id. at 619; RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13(2) (1979); D. LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REME-
DIES 195 (1985); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 194 (1973).
86 ABA REPORT, supra note 63, at 4-30.
87 See generally Brown, supra note 81 (traditional view of tort law that threat of finan-
cial penalty from tort liability is incentive to avoid dangerous conduct).
88 Fleming, Is There a Future for Torts?, 44 LA. L. REV. 1193, 1198 (1984) (noting
sensitivity of some people, such as doctors, to stigma of adverse judgment and ability of
publicity associated with torts to reduce sales of dangerous products).
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system.8 9 Further, long delays between an injury and compensation
are common. 90 Ultimately, the compensation objective does not
justify the tort system's cost.9 1
States could achieve the compensation objective most effec-
tively by shifting accident victims' losses so that injured parties re-
ceive full and adequate compensation. States can best attain this by
shifting losses either to those who can best afford them or to those
who can best spread the costs over the broadest segment of soci-
ety.92 Although in many cases the tort system does shift losses to
those best able to bear them, this is not always the case. Further,
the cost-spreading justification usually is not the stated justification
for shifting losses.
The problem with viewing compensation as a primary tort ob-
jective is that it has no limits. If compensation were a primary goal
of tort law, that objective would direct the system to compensate
every victim fully. However, the justice and deterrence objectives
limit compensation. In theory, compensation is never the primary
policy concern in tort law; it is always subordinate to the dictates of
justice and deterrence.
III
ANALYSIS OF THE REFORMS: WHERE ARE THE STATES
TAKING TORT LAW?
The two major 1986 tort reforms limit joint and several liability
and cap noneconomic damages. Both of these reforms are likely to
decrease the level of care associated with some activities. Both of
these reforms are also likely to decrease the amount of compensa-
tion that accident victims will receive from tortfeasors. Of these two
reforms, limiting joint and several liability reduces safety and com-
pensation in a manner consistent with both the justice and deter-
rence objectives. Capping damages, however, at best randomly
furthers these objectives. Caps on damages are a blunt instrument;
the limits on joint and several liability, because of their selectivity,
better serve the objectives of tort law.
89 ABA REPORT, supra note 63, at 2-2 (noting that auto victims receive only 44% of
every insurance premium dollar, insurance company and agent receive 33% and lawyers
and claims investigators receive 23%).
90 3 F. HARPER, supra note 26, § 11.3, at 89 (citing study of California courts show-
ing median interval from date of complaint to date of trial ranging from 31 to 40
months).
91 R. POSNER, supra note 23, § 6.14, at 187 ("If compensation is the only purpose of
the negligence system, it is a poor system, being both costly and incomplete.").
92 G. CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 40 (Deep-pocket notion "holds that secondary
losses can be reduced most by placing them on the categories of people least likely to
suffer substantial social or economic dislocations as a result of bearing them, usually
thought to be the wealthy").
1988] TORT REFORM 643
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
A. The Effect of the 1986 Reforms on the Justice Objective
Limitations on joint and several liability and caps on
noneconomic damages reflect a certain systematic inconsistency in
the reforms. Limitations on joint and several liability further correc-
tive justice while caps on damages seem to disregard it.
1. The Effect of Limitations on Joint and Several Liability
The doctrine of joint and several liability dates back over five
hundred years.9 3 At the time joint and several liability was insti-
tuted, contributory negligence reigned and the concept of negli-
gence was much narrower than it is today.9 4 Originally, joint and
several liability applied only to tortfeasors who acted in concert.9 5
The justification for the doctrine is that the victim's damage is indi-
visible and that a wrongdoing defendant, rather than an innocent
plaintiff, should suffer the burden of a codefendant's insolvency.9 6
Today, parties not acting in concert may be jointly liable for a
harm,9 7 liability is not always based on fault,9 8 and comparative neg-
ligence is the generally accepted rule.99 Under these circumstances,
joint and several liability does not further justice. Rather, joint and
several liability, particularly in combination with comparative negli-
gence, imposes an injustice on solvent defendants.
Comparative negligence provides a means by which to allocate
damages. Comparative negligence also means that a recovering
plaintiff is not necessarily completely innocent. Under comparative
negligence, in a one-defendant case the factfinder determines the
degree of responsibility of both the defendant and the plaintiff. The
defendant is then only responsible for a percentage of the damages
equal to his percentage of fault. In cases involving more than one
tortfeasor, where one defendant is insolvent or unavailable, the sol-
vent defendants pay a share of the damages greater than their share
of the responsibility for the harm caused.
In cases where only a small percentage of the injury is attributa-
93 See Cocke v. Jennor, 80 Eng. Rep. 214 (K.B. 1432); 3 F. HARPER, supra note 26,
§ 10.1, at 1-2 (noting that the principle ofjoint and several liability was established early
in the common law).
94 Fleming, supra note 88, at 1193 (until end of 19th century, duties of care were
"kept under stringent control" or denied; assumption of risk and contributory negli-
gence "denied recovery even to victims of proven negligence").
95 W. KEETON, supra note 26, § 46, at 322.
96 See, e.g., American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 588, 578
P.2d 899, 405, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 188 (1978).
97 See, e.g., Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School, 22 Cal. 3d 508, 585 P.2d 851,
150 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978) (school district and motorcyclist); Kimbler v. Stillwell, 78 Or.
App. 636, 717 P.2d 1223 (1986) (store owner and murderer).
98 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
99 See supra note 46.
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ble to a solvent defendant's action, that defendant often did not
choose to deal with the insolvent tortfeasor anymore than the plain-
tiff did.100 In many instances, the plaintiff would not have been in-
jured without the insolvent tortfeasor's action.' 0 I In such a case,
holding the solvent defendant liable for a disproportionate share of
the damages is unjust. However, as the percentage of harm attribu-
table to the solvent defendant rises, the original justifications for
joint and several liability again are applicable. If the harm attributa-
ble to the tortfeasors is approximately equal, it is more likely that
any one of the tortfeasors alone would have caused the injury.
Under these circumstances, requiring a defendant to pay any por-
tion of the damages is reasonable. Thus, the statutes that make a
solvent defendant's liability for an insolvent defendant's portion of
damages dependent on the parties' percentage of fault are more
finely tuned to the justice objective than those that completely elimi-
nate joint and several liability.
Even those reforms that limit rather than eliminate joint and
several liability may leave plaintiffs with uncompensated losses.
Although a defendant's insolvency may result in a loss to the plain-
tiff, justice does not necessarily require that this loss should shift to
a solvent defendant. The tort system's treatment of analogous situ-
ations provides support for this contention. For example, when a
plaintiff contributes to his own harm, the defendant is not liable for
the portion of the loss caused by the plaintiff. 10 2 In addition, in
cases with only one defendant, if that defendant is insolvent, the tort
system does not shift the plaintiff's loss to another. A defendant's
insolvency is a loss that the tort system does not normally
compensate.
103
When a state decides whether to eliminate joint and several lia-
bility, it in effect chooses whether to leave a plaintiff with a loss or to
impose that loss on a solvent defendant. Either choice results in a
hardship to one of the parties. However, the hardship that eliminat-
ing joint and several liability places on a plaintiff is more palatable
than the hardship that keeping joint and several liability places on a
solvent defendant. Joint and several liability creates an injustice;
0 4
100 See cased cited supra note 97.
101 See, e.g., Kimbler v. Stillwell, 78 Or. App. 636, 717 P.2d 1223 (1986) (owner of
gun store held liable for wrongful death because decedent's killer used gun stolen from
the store).
102 Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault Laws-An Analysis of the Al-
ternatives, 40 LA. L. REV. 343, 363 (1980).
103 Id. at 363 ("This result is consistent with the general legal attitude toward plain-
tiffs who are faced with an absent or insolvent defendant; the law does not guarantee to
every plaintiff a defendant who has neither of these characteristics.").
104 See WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 6, at 64 ("Joint and several liability fre-
quently... operates in a highly inequitable manner.").
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it takes the loss of one party and shifts it to a party who is not re-
sponsible for it. A system without joint and several liability merely
leaves a loss where it finds it. Tort law cannot correct all that is
unjust, but it should not create injustices of its own.
The possible jury bias against deep-pocket defendants' 0 5 is rel-
evant to a discussion of the reforms limiting joint and several liabil-
ity. Indeed, this bias may have prompted the state legislatures to
enact the limitations, for the limitations represent an appropriate
response to a perceived abuse. If juries attribute some small per-
centage of plaintiffs' harm to "deep-pocket" defendants only to as-
sure that injured parties receive compensation, then joint and
several liability imposes an injustice to these deep-pocket defend-
ants. The reforms at least begin to correct this injustice.
2. The Effect of Caps on Noneconomic Damages
Like the limitations on joint and several liability, caps on
noneconomic damages deny plaintiffs full compensation for some of
their loss. Unlike the limitations on joint and several liability, how-
ever, capping noneconomic damages increases the injustice to plain-
tiffs. This increased injustice results because caps on such damages
are independent of causation and fault.
In the tort system, the concept ofjustice centers around notions
of causation and fault.' 0 6 Capping noneconomic damages addresses
neither of these notions. Thus, a court may find a defendant clearly
at fault and a victim completely innocent, and yet if the jury's award
exceeds the cap, the victim must bear some of the costs inflicted by
the culpable defendant. Forcing victims to bear these costs does not
mesh with the tort system's basic notion ofjustice. Indeed, capping
damages in some sense unjustly enriches those defendants whose
liability is capped. They gain the full benefit of their activity yet pay
only a portion of the cost.'0 7
105 See supra note 48.
106 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
107 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
Although noneconomic costs are not easily valued they are real costs. Pierce, supra
note 83, at 1295. Awarding plaintiffs damages for pain and suffering "is a fixed part of
the American law on tort damages. Its established place in that law is implicit in count-
less opinions." ABA REPORT, supra note 63, at 5-176; see, e.g., Gruenthal v. Long Island
R.R., 393 U.S. 156 (1968) (holding that trial judge did not abuse discretion by allowing
$150,000 award for pain and suffering).
There is, however, an argument against compensation for intangible losses. Not
compensating for noneconomic losses may reduce the loss to society. If damages for
noneconomic losses cannot really compensate victims for their losses, requiring the de-
fendant to pay the plaintiff for them imposes a double burden on society. Ingber, supra
note 24, at 799. Because monetary compensation cannot remove or make up for a plain-
tiff's pain and suffering, the plaintiff's unhappiness continues. In addition, the defend-
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Legislatures have enacted caps as a response to inconsistent
jury verdicts and disproportionately large verdicts against deep-
pocket defendants. The legislatures may perceive the caps as fair
because they force the tort system to treat victims more consist-
ently.' 08 However, this consistency argument is flawed. Although
victims with the same injuries will not receive radically different
awards for noneconomic damages, victims who are only slightly in-
jured may receive the same award as those who are very seriously
injured. Ultimately, the caps on noneconomic damages most hurt
those who are most seriously injured. 10 9 Some states have enacted
statutes that attempt to cure the disproportionate effects of damage
caps on severely injured plaintiffs by allowing awards greater than
the caps in certain circumstances.' 10
The caps also are inconsistent with the legal system's reliance
on the jury system. A jury trial is an important constitutional
right. 11' By placing caps on damages, legislatures have decided that
juries are incapable of determining damages. If caps on damages
indicate that legislatures believe that juries cannot accurately deter-
mine damages, why should plaintiffs who are awarded less than the
cap be bound by this inaccurate determination? If caps do not indi-
cate that legislatures distrust juries, then the caps allow defendants
to avoid fully compensating plaintiffs for injuries that they have
caused.
B. The Effect of the 1986 Reforms on the Deterrence
Objective
Both the reforms that limit joint and several liability and those
that cap damages are likely to diminish the deterrence effect of tort
law. Decreasing the level of deterrence is not, however, necessarily
incompatible with the deterrence objective. Even if deterrence is
ant is less happy and therefore societal happiness is decreased by twice the plaintiff's
unhappiness.
The fact that pain and suffering damages have been a key element of American law
for a long time does not compel continuing the practice, but the long-continued accept-
ance of the principle and the willingness of juries to award large verdicts for pain and
suffering does indicate something about community values. ABA REPORT, supra note 63,
at 5-163, 5-182-83.
108 Some commentators contend that one of the tort system's faults is that it often
allows different damage awards for the same injuries. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 83, at
1291-94; Trollin, supra note 6, at 4 ("because it is difficult to assign dollar amounts to
non-economic damages ... awards vary greatly from one jury to the next").
109 Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 942, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (1980) ("It is simply
unfair and unreasonable to impose the burden of supporting the medical care industry
[via caps on damages] solely upon those persons who are most severely injured and
therefore most in need of compensation.").
110 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
11 1 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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tort law's primary objective, deterring all unsafe behavior would not
necessarily benefit society. Too much safety can be bad for society.
The deterrence objective seeks to achieve the optimal amount of
safety.' 12 The statutory limitations on joint and several liability de-
crease deterrence consistently with the deterrence objective. The
statutory caps on noneconomic damages, however, conflict with this
objective.
1. The Effect of Limitations on Joint and Several Liability
The reforms that limit joint and several liability may decrease
deterrence if liability or the fear of liability actually deters potential
defendants from engaging in dangerous activities. This result fol-
lows intuitively-if defendants' potential liability decreases, they will
be more likely to engage in potentially dangerous activities. Basic
economic theory supports this conclusion. An actor will continue to
take additional care, or continue to reduce his level of activity, until
the costs of any additional care or reduction in activity equal any
additional benefits he would gain from such additional care or re-
duction in activity.
113
The benefit that an actor receives by taking additional care or
reducing his level of activity is his avoidance of accident costs. Ex-
pected accident costs are the costs of injuries for which an actor ex-
pects to be held liable. Under joint and several liability, this cost
depends upon the probability of an accident occurring, the likely
severity of that accident, and the probability that another actor who
might contribute to the victim's injury will be insolvent or immune
from suit. 1 14 The actor can reduce the possibility that an accident
will occur either by increasing the amount he spends on safety or by
decreasing the level of his activity. 115
By eliminating joint and several liability, legislatures have elimi-
nated an element of an actor's expected accident costs. An actor's
expected accident costs no longer depend upon the probability that
another actor who contributes to the victim's injury will be insolvent
or immune from suit. The actor's expected accident costs will be
lower for every level of care. Because the activity becomes less
112 Seesupra note 81.
113 R. POSNER, supra note 23, § 6.8, at 173; see also Pierce, supra note 83 ("The entity
bearing the costs of accidents will have an incentive to keep spending to reduce those
costs up to the point at which marginal cost of accident avoidance equals marginal costs
of accidents.").
114 But see Comment, The Case of the Disappearing Defendant: An Economic Analysis, 132
U. PA. L. REV. 145, 166-67 (1983) (arguing that if actor considers his potential for insol-
vency, several liability rule will result in lesser standard of care than will joint and several
liability).
115 G. CALABRESI, supra note 4, at 73.
648 [Vol. 73:628
TORT REFORM
costly, the actor may engage in a higher level of activity. I16
The effect of eliminating joint and several liability on an actor's
level of care in a given activity is somewhat tempered because he will
not reduce his level of care below some minimum level at which he
knows that he alone can cause an injury. Although eliminating joint
and several liability decreases the actor's expected accident costs at
every level of care above this minimum, the accident costs decrease
less as the actor's activity alone becomes more likely to cause an
accident. For example, a municipality's highway department must
maintain its highways to a certain safety level below which even safe
and careful drivers will be injured. If the department allows bridges
to deteriorate to the extent that their structure is dangerously but
invisibly weakened, the highway department alone will be liable for
any injury resulting from the bridge's weakened condition. Elimi-
nating joint and several liability would not reduce the highway de-
partment's accident costs associated with improper maintenance of
bridges. Because eliminating joint and several liability will only
lower expected accident costs for levels of care above the minimum,
the more unsafe the behavior, the less the limitations on joint and
several liability will reduce deterrence.
A lower level of safety is not necessarily bad. If the tort system
holds an actor liable for costs greater than those associated with his
activity, he will not engage in the most efficient level of activity-he
will be too safe. As a result, the price of the actor's activity will be
too high relative to the price of other activities, and society will en-
gage in a suboptimal level of that activity.' 1 7
Joint and several liability sometimes forces an actor to pay for
costs that do not result from his activity. These forced costs lead to
a misallocation of resources because actors spend too much on
safety. When states limit joint and several liability, however, actors'
liability corresponds more closely to activity-related costs. Thus,
although limiting joint and several liability reduces the tort law's de-
terrent effect, it does so in a carefully tailored manner, consistent
with the efficiency limitations of deterrence.
2. The Effect of Caps on Noneconomic Damages
Like limits on joint and several liability, caps on noneconomic
damages will allow some defendants to pay a smaller damage award
116 Id. at 70 ("Failure to include accident costs in the prices of activities will, accord-
ing to the theory, cause people to choose more accident-prone activities .... ).
117 Pierce, supra note 83, at 1304 ("Because many products and activities that are
dangerous are also beneficial, there is a distinct possibility that forcing complete inter-
nalization of accident costs to those entities that can best control accident costs would
not produce optimum allocation of resources in important segments of the economy.").
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and they will either decrease or, at best, have no effect on deter-
rence. The caps will move the court system toward an optimal level
of deterrence only ifjury verdicts for noneconomic damages are too
high. If jury verdicts accurately reflect the cost of noneconomic
damages, then the caps undervalue these costs by setting arbitrary
limits on them. Thus, caps do not force actors to internalize all of
the costs associated with their activity, resulting in either too high a
level of that activity' 18 or too little safety.
One certain effect of the caps is that actors' expected accident
costs will be less for every type of behavior or level of activity that
results in noneconomic losses that are greater than the caps. Thus,
an actor will have less incentive to invest in safety under a system
with capped damages than under one without caps. Similarly, be-
cause an actor presumably will continue his activity until the activ-
ity's costs equal its benefits, by reducing costs the caps may spur
increased activity.1 19
As with the limitations on joint and several liability, the caps on
damages will have no or a lesser effect on expected accident costs
below a certain level of care. The caps will most affect activities that
produce the greatest injuries; they will decrease deterrence the most
in those activities that cause the worst harm. For small injuries the
costs will remain the same, but for more serious injuries the costs
will decrease.
The caps on noneconomic damages will probably decrease the
level of deterrence in the tort system. Whether this decrease in de-
terrence is a move toward the optimal level of deterrence depends
on the accuracy of jury verdicts.
C. The Effect of the 1986 Reforms on the Compensation
Objective
Both limitations on joint and several liability and caps on
noneconomic damages will reduce plaintiffs' compensation. Be-
cause compensation is merely one of tort law's subsidiary goals, re-
forms providing for less compensation do not necessarily depart
from traditional tort objectives. The limitations on joint and several
liability decrease compensation more consistently with justice, de-
terrence, and traditional tort notions of compensation than do the
caps on noneconomic damages.
1. The Effect of Limitations on Joint and Several Liability
Limitations on joint and several liability do not alter the amount
118 Id. at 1295.
119 See supra note 116.
650 [Vol. 73:628
19881 TORT REFORM 651
of compensation that plaintiffs deserve. Rather, these limitations
change only what plaintiffs actually receive. Plaintiffs receive judg-
ments for the full amount of their injuries, yet collect only that por-
tion allocated to solvent defendants. As a result, justice is done as
between the plaintiff and each solvent defendant. At the same time,
each solvent defendant must internalize the costs of his activities.
This internalization of costs reduces the actor's level of injury-pro-
ducing activity.1 20 This result coincides with the deterrence and jus-
tice objectives. Each solvent defendant compensates the plaintiff
fully for the injuries attributable to that defendant's activity.
Although eliminating joint and several liability may prevent full
compensation of victims, compensation should not upset the result
that both deterrence and justice dictate.
2. The Effect of Caps on Noneconomic Damages
In any system of compensation, someone must decide who
should be compensated and how much these people should re-
ceive.1 2 1 In a system of limited resources, these two decisions are
dependant upon one other. Traditionally, tort law limited compen-
sation to those who were injured by the act or omission of another.
The amount of compensation was typically the amount needed to
recompense the plaintiff fully for the harm done. 122 Over the years,
tort law has expanded the pool of plaintiffs who are eligible for com-
pensation.1 23 As a result, the system has become overburdened,
forcing legislatures to react.
124
Full compensation for personal injuries has always been tort
law's measure of damages. 125 Clearly, the caps on damages are in-
120 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
121 Schmalz, On the Financing of Compensation Systems, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 807, 810
(1985) ("Each system requires a 'compensation governor,' which must blend two fac-
tors: eligibility for compensation and benefit levels.").
122 Id. at 810-11 (in traditional tort law, "[e]ligibility is controlled by the definition
of fault acting jointly with the strength of the causal link," and "[t]he amount is deter-
mined by the full restoration standard").
123 See supra notes 14-17 (discussing factors which have led to expansion of liability).
124 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.1(c) (West Supp. 1987) ("Local governments
have been forced to curtail some essential police, fire and other protections because of
the soaring costs of lawsuits and insurance premiums."); 1986 N.Y. Laws ch. 220, § 1, in
N.Y. INs. LAw § 2344 note on legislative intent ("These events have disastrous effects
... and threaten to undermine economic development and the delivery of essential and
necessary services .... "); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.160 note on Preamble-Laws 1986,
ch. 305 (Supp. 1988) ("These escalating costs ultimately affect the public through higher
taxes, loss of essential services, and loss of the protection provided by adequate
insurance.").
125 Schmalz, supra note 121, at 810 ("The tort law's compensation standard has re-
mained constant for decades in the face of sweeping changes in almost every other as-
pect of the law. The wrongdoer must pay the victim full compensation for the harm
done.").
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consistent with full compensation. These caps combine the tort sys-
tem's cost and time-consumption with less than full compensation
for plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
Although limitations on joint and several liability vary among
the states, generally these limitations are an appropriate means of
reforming the tort system. They help the tort system achieve its
goals by lessening the injustice in the system, by fostering an opti-
mal level of deterrence, and by maintaining the tort system's tradi-
tional method of measuring damages. Limiting joint and several
liability furthers tort's objectives both in theory and in the imperfect
tort system that actually exists.
In contrast, the caps on noneconomic damages are inconsistent
with tort law's traditional goals. They ignore the system's individu-
alized nature and result in a suboptimal level of deterrence. Even if
one assumes that the caps are accurate, they seem misdirected and
out of place in the tort system. If the problem that these caps seek
to correct is jury lawlessness, then, unless legislators consciously de-
cide to change the principles upon which tort law rests, and do so
consistently across the board, the jury system rather than the tort
system's principle of full compensation should be reformed.
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